Is Berkshire a good investment if it trades above its intrinsic value?
Berkshire Hathaway trades at $571 per B share as of 6 November 2026, against a base case intrinsic value of $524, built on the 30 September 2026 balance sheet and on estimates of normalised earnings power from the 2025 Form 10-K. A share price around 9% above the base case intrinsic value does not inherently mean Berkshire is no longer a good long-term investment.
Buying a business above its intrinsic value lowers the return you should expect. It does not mean there is no return. Everything below is an attempt to show the difference between those two statements using a rental house, one page of arithmetic, and twenty-six years of Berkshire’s own record.
A business trading above its intrinsic value offers a lower expected return, not the absence of one, and that distinction is what decides whether a premium is a reason to stay away or a reason to expect less.
The short answer At $571 Berkshire trades about 9% above my estimate of its intrinsic value, which is a modest premium: it puts the shares on 1.60× book value when the twenty-six year median is 1.50×. A buyer at that price is starting from an earnings yield of about 4.8% rather than the 5.2% the same earnings would yield at intrinsic value. That is the whole penalty for the premium: roughly half a percentage point a year off the starting return. Against it sits an earnings stream I expect to grow 5% to 8% a year, and which is retained inside the company instead of being paid out, so it compounds. A premium of this size is a reason to expect less. It is not a reason to conclude that nothing will be earned.
What the estimate actually is
Intrinsic value is what a business is worth to somebody who owns it and keeps it, which is a different question from what it trades for this morning. The price is set by whoever is willing to trade today. The value is set by the cash earnings the business will produce over the years an owner holds it.
Berkshire is harder to value than most companies and easier than its reputation suggests. It is not one business on one multiple. It is a railroad, a group of regulated utilities, a very large insurance operation, several dozen manufacturers and retailers, a $336 B portfolio of other companies’ shares, and a mountain of Treasury bills. Each of those is worth something on its own terms.
So the estimate on this site is built the way an owner would build it: one business and one asset at a time. The railroad is valued as a railroad. The utilities are valued on the capital they have invested and are allowed to earn on. Insurance is valued on what it underwrites and on the float it holds. The quoted shares are counted at market value, because that is what they would fetch. The cash is counted as cash, less the $30 B Berkshire has committed never to spend. Then the parts are added up, the obligations are taken off, and the total is divided by the shares outstanding.
That arithmetic produces $1,115 B, or $524 per B share, with a range of $486 to $554 depending on the assumptions. Every one of those assumptions is set out, sourced and adjustable in the full valuation. It is an estimate, not a measurement, and the page that produces it says so at length.
The same question, asked about a house
Suppose a house is worth $500,000. It rents for $30,000 a year, and after taxes, insurance, maintenance and the months it sits empty, it nets $25,000. Buy it for $500,000 and you earn $25,000 on $500,000, which is 5%. Whether 5% is a good return depends on what else you could do with the money, and on your view of whether the rent and the house will be worth more in ten years than they are now.
Now pay 10% more. At $550,000 the house still nets the same $25,000, because the tenant does not care what you paid. Your return is now about 4.5%. You did not destroy the investment by overpaying by 10%. You reduced your return by about half a point a year. It may still be a perfectly sensible purchase, particularly if you think the rent will rise.
And it works in reverse. Buy the same house for $450,000 and the $25,000 becomes a 5.6% return. You get the growth either way; the discount is extra.
The point Price does not change what a business earns. It changes what you earn on what you paid. That is the entire mechanism behind buying above or below intrinsic value, and it is the same mechanism whether the asset is a house or a railroad.
So what would you earn paying intrinsic value for Berkshire?
Berkshire’s earning power, meaning what its businesses and investments should produce in a normal year and not what any single year happened to report, works out at about $58.4 B. On the 2.13 billion equivalent B shares outstanding at September 30, 2026, that is $27.44 a share.
Put that over the intrinsic value of $524 and the starting yield is 5.2%. Put it over today’s $571 and it is 4.8%. Those are the same two numbers as the house, arrived at the same way, and the premium happens to be about the same size.
| What you pay per B share | Price | Earning power per share | Starting yield |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10% below intrinsic value | $472 | $27.44 | 5.8% |
| Intrinsic value | $524 | $27.44 | 5.2% |
| The market price today | $571 | $27.44 | 4.8% |
Earning power of $58.4 B from the sum of the parts, held constant down the column, because the point of the table is that the price moves and the earnings do not.
A 4.8% starting yield on its own would be a modest proposition. It is not the whole proposition, for two reasons.
The first is growth. I estimate Berkshire’s earning power will grow approximately 5% to 8% a year, but not linearly: the railroad and the utilities grow with the economy and with their own operating improvements, the insurance operations grow the float, and the cash gets deployed. Repurchases can add a further 1% to 3% to value per share, though only while shares are being bought at or below intrinsic value. Those estimates are defended business by business across the valuation essay and the segment pages, which is most of what this site is.
The second is the one real difference from the house. A landlord receives the rent and has to find something to do with it. Berkshire pays no dividend, so its $27.44 is retained and reinvested inside the company. The house pays a simple return. Berkshire compounds, and over the sort of holding period this site is written for, that distinction does more work than the entry price does.
Where the price sits against the estimate
A single figure for intrinsic value would be false precision. The estimate is a range, because the assumptions behind it are judgements, and the chart below draws it as one. The market price is marked on the same axis.
The price sits above the upside case, not merely above the base case, and that is worth saying plainly: on these assumptions the market is paying more than the most generous set of them supports.
It is worth saying just as plainly how far above. The distance from the price to the upside case is 3%. The distance from my downside case to my upside case is 14%. In other words the market sits inside the range of outcomes this analysis already admits, near the top of it. A premium that is smaller than the width of the estimate it is measured against is not a warning. It is a rounding difference between two people working on the same company with slightly different assumptions.
Over twenty-six years, the price followed the value
If paying a premium mattered as much as the question implies, it would show up in the record. It does not, and the reason is arithmetic: over a long enough holding period, growth in the value swamps any premium paid for it.
Berkshire stopped publishing book value per share in 2018, so the figures below are derived from the balance sheet; the book value per share derivation sets out the method line by line. Book value is not intrinsic value and understates it, but it is the only measure of Berkshire’s own progress that can be computed consistently back to 1999. What it shows is that book value and the share price compounded at almost exactly the same rate.
| Measure | 1999 | Latest | Multiple | Per year |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Book value per B share | $24.55 | $357.73 | 14.6× | 10.5% |
| Share price | $36.60 | $570.89 | 15.6× | 10.8% |
| Price to book | 1.49× | 1.60× | — | 0.3% |
Book value per share derived from the Q3 2026 Form 10-Q; price at the November 6, 2026 close. Book value over 26.7 years, price over 26.8 years, which is why the two multiples are struck over slightly different periods.
Book value grew 10.5% a year. The share price grew 10.8% a year. Over more than a quarter of a century the gap between the two is 0.3% a year, which is the contribution of the whole change in rating. Berkshire began the period on 1.49× book value and sits on 1.60× today. Almost the entire return came from the business getting bigger, and almost none of it from investors deciding to pay more for it.
The band is the useful part. The year-end multiple has ranged from 1.18× book value in 2020 to 1.69× in 2007, with a median of 1.50×, and it has never settled anywhere for long. A buyer’s entry multiple was largely a matter of which year they happened to have money to invest. The compounding underneath it did not care which year that was.
This is also the clearest way to size today’s premium. At $571 over the Q3 2026 Form 10-Q book value, Berkshire trades on 1.60×. That is 6.7% above the twenty-six year median and 5.7% below the 2007 peak. In 16 of the 26 years on the chart the share price touched a higher multiple than today’s at some point during the year, and 8 of them closed above it. Whatever else this price is, it is not an unusual one for Berkshire.
What Berkshire itself was willing to pay
There is one place where Berkshire puts a number on its own intrinsic value, and it is not in the annual report. It is in the repurchase authorisation. Berkshire will buy its own shares, and the condition under which it is permitted to do so is a judgement about intrinsic value.
Berkshire's common stock repurchase program permits Berkshire to repurchase its Class A and Class B shares at prices below Berkshire's intrinsic value, as conservatively determined by Berkshire's Chief Executive Officer after consultation with the Chairman of the Board.
For the whole of the 2025 record that sentence read differently. The judgement was Warren Buffett’s, as “Berkshire’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer”. With the handover it now belongs to the chief executive, Greg Abel, after consultation with the chairman of the board. The test itself is unchanged: buy only below intrinsic value, conservatively determined.
That makes the repurchase table in each quarterly filing the most useful disclosure Berkshire publishes for anyone asking the question this page is about. It does not reveal the estimate, but it reveals prices that were underneath it.
| Month | Class A shares | Average price | Class B shares | Average price |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| July 2026 | 2,465 | $745,578.23 | 3,131,323 | $496.24 |
| August 2026 | 88 | $755,245.63 | 1,548,314 | $503.99 |
| September 2026 | 1,983 | $758,332.88 | 7,705,322 | $506.64 |
| Quarter, in B-share equivalents | 19,188,959 shares | $9.6 B | $502.69 | |
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 September 2026, Item 2. Class A prices converted at 1,500 B shares per A share so the two classes can be averaged. Berkshire has bought $14.4 B of its own stock so far in 2026, retiring 1.3% of the shares outstanding at an average of $497.12, after buying none at all in 2025.
Worth sitting with Berkshire repurchased shares at an average of $502.69 in the quarter, which is 4.1% below the $524 this site arrives at independently. Two different methods, one built from the outside out of filings and one held inside the company, landed within a few per cent of each other — and for the second quarter running. September 2026 was the heaviest month and the dearest, costing $1.2 B more than the other two together, which is a company buying with more conviction as the price rose rather than less.
The market now asks $571, which is 13.6% more than Berkshire itself was paying a few months ago. That is not a prediction about the share price. It is the clearest available evidence that a buyer today is paying more than the most informed possible buyer was willing to pay recently, and it is the honest answer to why this page describes the stock as modestly expensive and not cheap. What repurchases at those prices imply about the businesses underneath is taken up in where the cash goes.
Where that leaves it
I would rather buy Berkshire below intrinsic value, because then you are paid twice: once by the business growing and once by the discount closing. Buying modestly above intrinsic value can still be a good investment, because of the strength of what you are buying and because the alternative to owning it is owning something else.
There is also a decent chance the estimate here is too low. It values quoted shares at market and cash at cash, which is conservative by construction. It credits management with no acquisitions it has not yet made and no investments it has not yet announced. It assumes the railroad improves at a measured pace rather than at the pace its own management says is available. Each of those is a deliberate choice to be conservative, and together they probably understate what Berkshire will turn out to be worth.
So the position, stated as plainly as I can: Berkshire trades modestly above its fair value today. The premium costs a buyer about 0.4% of starting yield, and at the 5% to 8% growth I expect, the estimate itself grows into today’s price in somewhere between 1.1 and 1.8 years. That is the honest measure of the word modest: the gap is worth about eighteen months of Berkshire’s own progress. Its strength and its activity should keep making that progress at a healthy rate. Neither number is fixed. Price moves every day and intrinsic value moves every quarter, usually upward. A conclusion drawn from today’s gap between them has a short shelf life, which is the real argument for understanding how the figure is built instead of taking it from anybody, this site included.
What to do with this Work out your own figure. The assumptions that move the answer are all adjustable in the full valuation, and every segment page shows the reasoning behind one of them. Whether the result is an appropriate long-term home for your savings is a question about you and not about Berkshire, and this site does not try to answer it.
The rest of the site
Everything asserted above is built somewhere else on this site, from filings, with the arithmetic shown. The essay is the place to start.
The valuation essay
The whole case in seven charts: what Berkshire owns, what it earns, what it is worth and what you pay. Five sliders let you move the assumptions while you read.
Start hereFull SOTP valuation
Every line of the sum of the parts, with yields, growth estimates and the implied multiple on each segment.
Open the full tableBook value per share
The current figure, the four-line derivation behind it, and book value, float and price to book from 1999.
See the derivationBuffett and Munger
Sixty years, the structure they left behind, and what changes now that Greg Abel is chief executive.
Read the backgroundCapital allocation
Twenty years of cash flow and deployment, year by year, with the acquisition record annotated.
See the recordBNSF Railway
Volumes, pricing, operating ratio and capital intensity, benchmarked against Union Pacific.
Open BNSFBerkshire Hathaway Energy
Twenty-seven years of assets, equity and return on equity, the buyback valuations, and what the operations actually consist of.
Open BH EnergyManufacturing, Service & Retail
The industrial core: revenue, margins and earnings across all seven sub-segments since 2006.
Open MSRInsurance and float
What float costs, the underwriting result split five ways, and the assumptions the valuation rests on.
Open insuranceGEICO
Twenty-eight years of underwriting against Progressive, with policy counts and the combined ratio split in two.
Open GEICOThe public equity portfolio
What the marketable securities are, what they are carried at, and what they contribute to the valuation.
Open the portfolioFollow the research
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